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PERSONHOOD FOR SYNTHETIC BEINGS: LEGAL 
PARAMETERS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DAWN OF 
HUMANLIKE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
By Daniel S. Osborne1 
There is a growing interest in Artificial Intelligence in tech hubs 
like Silicon Valley and in the world at large that is finally matching the 
ambition and creativity that movies and media have been producing 
for a very long time. This paper takes that cultural interest and 
economic investment to its logical conclusion and assumes that a 
humanlike Artificial Intelligence, or synthetic person, can and will be 
created in the near future. Then it considers what the law should do 
about that creation. Specifically, this paper argues that a test should 
be developed for whether a synthetic person can be granted 
personhood under the law before such test is needed. The tenets, if not 
the specifics, of such a test are outlined here that provide for a synthetic 
person that is intelligent, social, self-conscious, and individualized.  
But that is only half the problem. If a synthetic person can be 
created, one that passes a pre-determined test that allows it to access 
legal standing, to what sorts of rights and responsibilities does it have 
access? In light of the kind of synthetic person that could pass the test, 
four potential outcomes for rights for a synthetic person are addressed 
ranging from none to a full suite of human civil rights. 
1 J.D. 2015, Salmon P. Chase College of Law. Special thanks to John Bickers, 
Gabriel Webb, Samuel Webb, and Courtney Osborne for listening to far-flung 
visions of the future. The author can be contacted at dsosborne@me.com. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If popular culture is to be believed, the dawn of an age of robots 
is an inevitable one.2 As a trope or theme in popular culture, the rise of 
intelligent mechanical beings, particularly robots, has been remarkably 
enduring and diverse. In most of these examples, be they happy 
coexistence, like the adorable bickering-couple-turned-heroes duo of 
R2-D2 and C-3PO in Star Wars;3 horrific, post-apocalyptic war against 
humanity, courtesy of The Matrix and the future as depicted in 
Terminator and its progeny;4 or bewildering gifts of robotic maids in 
Rocky IV;5 the relationship between man and machine is assumed or 
settled. Whether for good or ill, it is rare that the development of the 
relationship between man and machine is fully depicted.6 The before is 
typically assumed to be the present reality of the audience engaging the 
piece of pop culture and the after is the world depicted in the piece 
itself.7 The story that occurs in the middle, the transition from a world 
 
2 See Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, The Dawn of the Age of Artificial 
Intelligence, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/02/the-dawn-of-the-age-
of-artificial-intelligence/283730/ [https://perma.cc/YHN7-X7KX]. 
3 STAR WARS (Lucasfilm, Ltd. 1977). 
4 THE MATRIX (Matrix Films Pty Ltd. 1999); THE TERMINATOR (Hemdale, 
Productions 1984); TERMINATOR 2: JUDGMENT DAY (Carolco Pictures, Pacific 
Western Productions, and Lightstorm Entm’t 1991); TERMINATOR 3: RISE OF 
THE MACHINES (Intermedia Films 2003); TERMINATOR SALVATION (The 
Halcyon Co. 2009); TERMINATOR GENISYS (Paramount Pictures and 
Skydance Productions 2015). 
5 ROCKY IV (United Artists Corp. 1985). 
6 A very notable exception is the universe as depicted in the Mass Effect 
trilogy.  The series of video games examines organic-synthetic conflict though 
multiple stages. One alien race is attempting to win back their planet from 
their robotic creations in an overwhelming Israel-Palestine metaphor; 
depending on the player’s choices, this can even resolve peacefully.  One 
particular synthetic, a starship’s onboard AI, comes to terms with her coming 
alive and falling in love. All the while, the primary conflict of the series 
involves a war against a race of synthetics seeking to eradicate all intelligent 
organic life in the galaxy. See MASS EFFECT (Electronic Arts 2007); MASS 
EFFECT 2 (Electronic Arts 2010); MASS EFFECT 3 (Electronic Arts 2012); see 
also HER (Annapurna Pictures 2013); EX MACHINA (Film 4 Productions and 
DNA Films 2014). 
7 See THE MATRIX, supra note 4; see also THE TERMINATOR, supra note 4. 
These films even make this explicit, either by directly referencing the date of 
the film’s release (the ship on which the protagonists in The Matrix live is 
shown to have been built in the year of the film’s release, 1999) or by time 
travel (the eponymous robot in The Terminator comes back to the present day 
to kill Sarah Connor for her part in future resistance). 
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without sentient machines to a world with them, is much less frequently 
addressed and is most likely to be explained in a few lines of exposition 
rather than delved into at length.8 
However, this shift in realities, from a world where humans are 
the only known reasoning beings on our planet to sharing that mantle, 
is a matter of great importance and it is not a shift the law can afford to 
ignore. For starters, a recent study found that 41% of Americans 
somewhat or strongly support its continued development and 31% 
support or strongly support the development of high-level machine 
intelligence, perhaps of the sort that can rival humans.9 Beyond that, 
82% of Americans believe that robots and/or AI should be carefully 
managed.10 A legal system that has procedures for handling artificial 
beings could guide the course of future research in a direction that 
society would find acceptable. If a consensus, or something like it, can 
be reached regarding artificial beings and their status in society then 
individuals at the forefront of technology and design know the target at 
which they can aim. Second, the struggle of minority and marginalized 
individuals to be recognized as full-fledged persons with rights is a 
struggle that has been waged regrettably recently and in fact is 
ongoing.11 African-Americans, women, and members of the LGBTQ 
community have had to endure humiliating and dehumanizing laws and 
regulations designed to reduce their status to second-class or lower and 
have had to organize and self-advocate to be recognized as persons 
entitled to equal rights.12 The policy-makers of the 21st century would 
be wise to learn the lessons gleaned from these 19th and 20th century 
struggles.13 Lastly, a framework for addressing this issue should be 
established in the hopes of avoiding future conflict. It is true that some 
speculative fiction creators have suggested that conflict between 
humans and robots as natural and inevitable, but others have set up very 
 
8 Id.  
9 Baobao Zhang & Allan Dafoe, Artificial Intelligence: American Attitudes 
and Trends, UK: CENTER FOR THE GOVERNANCE OF AI, FUTURE OF HUMAN. 




10 Id. at 3. 
11 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
12 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
13 To be sure, the struggle for equal rights for homosexual persons has, very 
regrettably, carried into the 21st century, but with recent Supreme Court 
decisions, perhaps that struggle could draw largely to a close before the third 
decade of the 21st century. See Obergefell, supra note 11, at 2. 
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different versions of the relationship.14 Even in some of those visions 
of future conflict, the conflict is potentially avoidable, perhaps by the 
granting of equal rights and protection under the laws.15 All of this is, 
of course, speculative, but the upside of some forethought is the 
potential to create a peaceful future, while the costs of ignoring the 
issue could include destruction. 
The future of artificial beings is amorphous; no one can be 
entirely sure of what the next stage of development will look like. This 
amorphous quality has led to lexicographic confusion about what these 
artificial beings should be called. The kinds of entities discussed have 
been given a number of names by writers and thinkers over time: 
robots,16 androids,17 machines,18 artificial intelligence(s),19 avatars,20 
etc. Each of these runs the risk of being too specific. For example, while 
science fiction writer Isaac Asimov’s preferred term, “robots,” is more 
than adequate for his vision of artificial beings, the specific term 
“robot” draws to mind an image that precludes other kinds of artificial 
beings.21 A highly intelligent operating system or a self-conscious 
network of computers would completely confound the classic 
connotation of “robot.”22 Instead, a unified term that could encompass 
any of these subsets is preferable; a definition that can cover clunking 
and whirring robots, the version of Siri or Alexa that Silicon Valley 
will roll out in ten generations, and a networked intelligence is 
needed.23 “Synthetic” will serve, for our purposes, as the compromise 
term.24 Synthetic has the benefits of inclusivity, being a conceptual and 
linguistic binary to organic, and lacking the significant cultural 
baggage of some of the other entries.25  
 
14 See STAR WARS, supra note 3. 
15See THE ANIMATRIX (Village Roadshow Pictures, Silver Pictures, Square 
Pictures, Studio 4°C, Madhouse and DNA Productions 2003); see also MASS 
EFFECT 3, supra note 6. 
16 KAREL CAPEK, R.U.R. (1920). 
17 PHILIP K. DICK, DO ANDROIDS DREAM OF ELECTRIC SHEEP? (1968). 
18 THE MATRIX, supra note 4. 
19 MASS EFFECT 2, supra note 6. 
20 Woodrow Barfield, Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual Environments: 
Considering the Rights of Owners, Programmers and Virtual Avatars, 39 
AKRON L. REV. 649, 650 (2006). 
21 ISAAC ASIMOV, I, ROBOT (1950). 
22 HER, supra note 6. 
23 See id. 
24 As in “synthetic being,” as opposed to a carbon-based “organic being” like 
a human. See MASS EFFECT, supra note 6.  
25 In addition, “synthetic” is of a less derogatory quality than the commonly-
used “artificial.” 
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As a final note, this paper advances no assurances of synthetics 
as a coming fact of life. As mentioned, speculative fiction and certain 
genres of popular culture seem to take the rise of synthetics as a given, 
but speculative fiction has also been promising flying cars for some 
time, and nothing has come of these promises.26 There are thinkers and 
futurists who are entirely convinced of the certainty of the rise of 
synthetics.27 There are also individuals who are equally convinced that 
such things are impossible and best left to fiction.28 It is possible that 
none of this will come to pass and that the skeptics of Artificial General 
Intelligence could be entirely correct. However, it may not be in the 
country’s best interests to close its eyes and hope this never comes 
about. What this paper does seek is to (1) establish a cognizable test by 
which an artificial being can be recognized as a synthetic person and 
(2) discuss and advocate for a robust set of rights for these persons.  
I. THE TEST 
In order to be considered a person under the law, a synthetic 
must pass some understandable test.29 Outside of the realm of legal 
personhood, there are already tests meant to evaluate synthetics and the 
proximity of their capacity to humanity’s.30 As covered below, most of 
these existing tests evaluate the intelligence of the synthetic life. 
Though this is a necessary part of the larger test for personhood, 
 
26 THE JETSONS (Hanna-Barbera Productions 1962) (The Jetsons serves at a 
perfect example. Set in 2062, the Jetson family had both a flying car and a 
sentient robot maid. Strangely, Rosie, the robotic maid, has become 
dramatically more probable seeming than their private spaceship with an 
engine that makes that iconic puttering sound.). 
27 See RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF INTELLIGENT MACHINES (1990). 
28 See Luciano Floridi et al., Turing’s Imitation Game: Still an Impossible 
Challenge for All Machines and Some Judges––An Evaluation of the 2008 
Loebner Contest, 19 MINDS & MACHINES 145, 149 (2009), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235223778_ 
[https://perma.cc/A8CS-9N73?type=image] (“Although we might never be 
able to build truly intelligent machines––as we suspect…”). 
29 F. Patrick Hubbard, "Do Androids Dream?": Personhood and Intelligent 
Artifacts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 405, 419 (2011) (“Regardless of the nature of a 
challenge to human uniqueness, addressing the challenge will require a 
standard of the attributes and capabilities that a challenger must satisfy in 
order to be the equivalent of a human in terms of personhood.”). 
[https://perma.cc/4GS6-YQMZ]. 
30 Joshua Batson, Forget the Turing Test: Here’s How We Could Actually 
Measure AI, WIRED (June 12, 2014, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2014/06/beyond-the-turing-test/ (examples of these 
tests include tests for facial recognition, audio interpretation, image 
processing, and language comprehension, among others.). 
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intelligence cannot be the only prong, just as the human experience is 
not predicated solely on IQ or grade point average. 
For the purposes of recognizing legal personhood, a synthetic 
person is a non-organic unit displaying intelligence, social 
interactivity, self-consciousness, and substantive personality. 
A. A Non-Organic Unit 
From the outset, this issue is fraught with potential 
speciesism.31 The first example of this is what a “non-organic unit” 
means. When determining whether a human is a person, society and 
the law look to the boundaries of the body, the limitations of that 
physical form, and the mental capacity housed in that body to 
determine whether it is a person. For example, individuals with 
chimerism, a rare genetic disorder which results in one body having in 
it two or more different sets of DNA, are counted as only one person, 
since there is only one body and one mind at play.32 In the same way, 
individuals suffering from dissociative personality disorder are also 
treated as only one person.33 Though dissociative personality disorder 
results in what presents as more than one mind, because the multiple 
minds occur in the same body and arise from the same brain makes for 
only one person.34  Roughly speaking, the rule is one person per body, 
and it is relatively simple.35  
 
31 See Hubbard, supra note 29, at 430. 
32 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, ET AL., Special Topics—Miscellaneous, MOD. SCI. 
EVIDENCE § 31:37 (2013-2014 Edition) (citing to James R. Lupski, Genome 
Mosaicism—One Human, Multiple Genomes, 341 (6144) SCIENCE 358 
(2013). 
33 See State v. Grimsley, Ohio App., 444 N.E.2d 1071, 1075–76 (1982) 
(“There was only one person driving the car and only one person accused of 
drunken driving.  It is immaterial whether she was in one state of 
consciousness or another, so long as in the personality then controlling her 
behavior, she was conscious and her actions were a product of her own 
volition.”).  It would be incorrect to say that, in a criminal context, it may not 
be possible for a person with dissociative personality disorder to successfully 
plead insanity, but it would be incorrect to assert that the personalities are 
distinct people. See Felicia G. Rubenstein, Committing Crimes While 
Experiencing A True Dissociative State: The Multiple Personality Defense 
and Appropriate Criminal Responsibility, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 353, 353–54 
(1991). 
34 Grimsley, 444 N.E.2d at 1075–76. 
35 Except, of course, when it is not simple. See Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 
(1973), modified by, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
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For synthetics, it is not so straightforward; the relationship 
between mind and body works differently for computers than it does 
for humans. Here are three examples: first, even now, it is entirely 
possible to run two or more separate operating systems, even on older 
machines; two separate “computers” running off of a single hardware 
construct.36 Though both run off a single hardware interface and are 
manipulated by the same keyboard and mouse, for all intents and 
purposes, the two are actually separate computers.37 These two separate 
software computers can even be dramatically different; one, for 
instance, could run off of one company’s operating system while the 
other runs off of a direct competitor.38 This is analogous to the popular, 
if incomplete and reductive, conception of dissociative personality 
disorder: two or more mental constructs cohabiting one physical 
entity.39 Second, one synthetic program could operate or control more 
than one hardware platform.40 Outside of perhaps hypnosis, this has no 
organic parallel. Third, the operating system and software platforms 
can be transferred evenly and cleanly from one physical machine to 
another.41 Settings, files, programs, and other data can be seamlessly 
transferred from one machine to another, in the case of hardware failure 
or something similar in the first hardware.42 This would be akin to a 
human transferring her mind, memories, experiences, and knowledge 
to a new body. This, like mind control, is currently fiction. 
Because parallels to the human experience fall flat in the face 
of these technological challenges, synthetics should be evaluated on 
their own terms. For a definition of “unit” it is better to look toward 
 
36 Whitson Gordon, How to Run Mac OS X Inside Windows Using VirtualBox, 
GIZMODO (Aug. 28, 2012, 11:59 AM), https://io9.gizmodo.com/how-to-run-
mac-os-x-inside-windows-using-virtualbox-5938332 [https://perma.cc/LJ8P-
WBNE]. 
37 See MASS EFFECT 2, supra note 6 (One of the characters, Legion, is a 
synthetic comprised of one hardware platform containing over a thousand 
individual, self-aware software programs.). 
38 Gordon, supra note 36 (Apple OS X and Microsoft Windows running 
simultaneously on the same machine). 
39 See Grimsley, 444 N.E.2d at 1075–76. 
40 See MASS EFFECT 2, supra note 6 (One of the groups of synthetic beings 
called “Geth” function on the basis of “consensus.” Though the community is 
comprised of a number of individuals, each capable of independent thought 
and reasoning, they act as a collective hive mind and require consensus among 
members before a certain route can be taken.). 
41 Christopher Breen, Move Data from an Old Mac to a New Mac, 
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another prong of this test: substantive personality.43 If the synthetic can 
meet those criteria, then its status as a “unit” should be assumed.  
But this prong is more than a tautology. Though it does not add 
a potential burden for synthetics, it serves another critical purpose: 
preserving status quo for organic personhood. As some have expressed 
concern, tests designed to allow synthetics to achieve personhood 
frequently run the risk of excluding subsets of humanity.44 Any test that 
seeks to expand the bounds of personhood but takes away the 
established personhood of others cannot be tolerated. But setting up 
categorical distinctions between organic and synthetic individuals 
becomes a tolerable way to defend the personhood of defenseless 
humans. 
B. Intelligence 
As noted above, intelligence is the most popularly discussed 
aspect of synthetic personhood.45 But what do we mean by 
intelligence? If it is a question of brute force computing power, 
humanity was surely outstripped years ago.46 Services are free to the 
public that allow for on-the-spot calculations of difficult puzzles 
requiring not only a strong mathematic ability, but also expansive, 
detailed, and even trivial knowledge about the world.47 An Internet-
 
43 See infra Part I.E. 
44 Hubbard, supra note 29, at 413 (“Human personhood often involves a matter 
of degree because some humans, like children and adults who are mentally or 
psychologically dysfunctional, lack the capacity to understand and exercise 
autonomy. Despite this lack of capacity, we grant these humans certain rights 
of personhood. For example, they can own property, though someone must 
exercise their property rights on their behalf. In addition, they cannot be 
owned or sold, and it is murder to kill them intentionally.”). 
45 Talking to Machines, RADIOLAB (May 30, 2011), 
https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolab/episodes/137407-talking-to-
machines. 
46 Terry Walby, Why the Turing Test Is a Flawed Benchmark, WIRED (June 
19, 2012, 2:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/06/flawed-turing-test/ 
[https://perma.cc/5QSU-44LN] (“Take today’s autonomic management 
systems, for example.  These expert systems have the capability to interpret 
and correlate myriad simultaneous events.  This includes “technical” events 
such as monitors, tests, probes and analyzers; but it also includes human input, 
even natural language interaction, in the form of speech, email or instant 
messages.  The systems have the capability to calculate in milliseconds, based 
on those events a series of probabilities and how to react to them. And when 
they react, they have the capability to execute multiple simultaneous tasks at 
once, each time using the result of an action to inform the next.”). 
47 See WOLFRAMALPHA, wolframalpha.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2021); see 
also Walter Hickey, 32 Tricks You can do With Wolfram Alpha, The Most 
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connected device or service has an especially powerful computing 
ability that puts humanity’s greatest geniuses to shame.48 But no one 
would argue that the ability to do arithmetic or compete on Jeopardy! 
is the full measure of human intelligence. 
So intelligence must mean more than simply the ability to 
make calculations or play games. Instead, the intelligence displayed by 
a synthetic must be more rounded and nuanced to more closely mirror 
the kind of intelligence humans display, an intelligence that is capable 
of navigating multiple, discrete tasks and demands, often 
simultaneously.49 The goal is not to create an artificial human, but 
rather to instill within a synthetic the capacity needed to integrate with 
human society. The intelligences must be of three distinct categories: 
verbal, adaptive, and moral. 
1. Verbal Intelligence 
Though it has its critics, it is nearly impossible to discuss 
intelligence in a synthetic without talking about the Turing Test.50 Alan 
Turing’s eponymous test is a juggernaut in classic examinations of 
artificial intelligence.51 Oversimplified, the Turing Test (“TT”) 
requires a human judge to sit in a room with computer screen and 
keyboard in front of her.52 The screen has a chat or instant message 
interface through which the human communicates with two different 
partners: one human and one machine.53 The judge then must determine 
 
Useful Site in The History of The Internet, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 9, 2013, 
3:25 AM), https://www.businessinsider.in/32-Tricks-You-Can-Do-With-
Wolfram-Alpha-The-Most-Useful-Site-In-The-History-Of-The-
Internet/articleshow/21056630.cms [https://perma.cc/VQL9-9TG4] (the 
article shows that Wolfram Alpha can calculate nutrition facts for foods and 
recipes, compare corporate stock values, investments, energy price trends, 
etc.). 
48 Walby, supra note 46. 
49 Id.  It is a repeated point of contention among apologists for synthetics that 
it is flatly unfair to keep trying to make artificial intelligence exactly mirror 
human intelligence. However, given that proto-synthetics are made by man 
under man’s schema of intelligence and because their development is still in 
its most nascent stages, synthetics will be expected to meet on a more human 
playing field. 
50 Ayse Pinar Saygin et al., Turing Test: 50 Years Later, 10 MINDS AND 
MACHINES 463, 463 (2000), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2435828_Turing_Test_50_Years_
Later [https://perma.cc/MHK5-6BN4]. 
51 Id. (“Turing’s paper has been considered to represent the ‘beginning’ of 
artificial intelligence (AI) and the TT has been considered its ultimate goal.”). 
52 Id. at 465–66. 
53 Id. 
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which of her partners is a computer and which is a human; if the 
computer can pass for human one-third of the time, then it has passed 
the TT.54 
There are a number of criticisms raised against the TT.55 One 
of the most enduring, John Searle’s “Chinese Room” problem, attempts 
to undercut Turing’s basic premise: that conversational aptitude could 
even represent intelligence.56 In the Chinese Room, a man who speaks 
no Chinese is trapped with a book of Chinese phrases and responses.57 
Under a slot in the door, pieces of paper with Chinese script are passed 
to the man and the man must then go to the book, find the phrase given 
to him, then copy the response and pass it under the door.58 Searle’s 
argument is that the computer cannot be said to be intelligent if it is 
merely using a lookup table to find pre-recorded answers.59 
The Chinese Room has been addressed and countered on a 
number of grounds, but two deserve special mention: (1) to engage in 
 
54 See Talking to Machines, supra note 45 (Note, one third seems a bit strange 
and arbitrary and it would seem that half, or 51%, would be the better number.  
But, if it were the case that a computer could pass for a human more times 
than a human, then the situation is, in fact, quite serious.); see also Randall 
Munroe, Turing Test, XKCD, https://xkcd.com/329/ 
[https://perma.cc/GW7B-MZKT] (“Turing Test Extra Credit: Convince the 
examiner that he’s a computer. ‘You know, you make some really good points.  
I’m . . .  not even sure who I am anymore.’”). 
55 It has been observed that such an inquiry is somewhat speciesist.  See 
Walby, supra note 46 (“A machine should not demonstrate intelligence by 
emulating a human. In fact, in some regards today’s expert systems are 
displaying intelligence far beyond the capability of a human.  Should we mask 
such intellectual prowess in order for the machine to appear human or allow it 
to run free to reach its full potential?”). Asking synthetics to communicate just 
how humanity does instead of in the form that is most natural to them is putting 
additional hurdles in what is sure to be an uphill battle for civil rights. This is 
a compelling notion and the potential injury to the synthetic population should 
not be considered lightly. However, the pragmatic fact remains that, even 
through media like the Internet, communication between people is still heavily 
verbal and such an ability to interact would be profoundly necessary in order 
to give testimony in court. For now, the verbal intelligence is of high 
importance to the inquiry.  
56 David Cole, The Chinese Room Argument, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Mar. 19, 2003), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/ 
[https://perma.cc/G4ER-FJWV] (last updated Apr. 9, 2014). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. (“1. If Strong AI is true, then there is a program for Chinese such that if 
any computing system runs that program, that system thereby comes to 
understand Chinese.  2. I could run a program for Chinese without thereby 
coming to understand Chinese. 3. Therefore Strong AI is false.”). 
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conversation requires much more than a simple look up table,60 and (2) 
if a computer is able to present a believable simulation of intelligent 
human conversation, how is that dramatically different from what 
humans do?61 
Despite criticisms, the TT survives and contestants regularly 
make appearances to attempt to pass the test.62 The TT continues as the 
standard-bearer in discussions such as this because it is (1) very simple, 
both in theory and in execution, and (2) is so far a remarkably difficult 
test for a synthetic to pass. To date, no challenger has passed.63 
This segment is not, ultimately, meant to provide a spirited 
defense of the TT. It has been over a century since Turing’s birth, and 
it is entirely conceivable that a new test may be more appropriate to 
take the TT’s place in the near future.64 These defenses of the TT are 
intended to represent defenses of verbal intelligence as a necessary 
benchmark that a synthetic must reach in order to call itself intelligent. 
There is a hidden benefit here as well. Verbal intelligence is not only a 
suitably challenging benchmark from a functional intelligence and 
engineering standpoint, it will also facilitate easier communication 




60 Hector J. Levesque, Is it Enough to Get the Behaviour Right?,  
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST INT’L JOINT CONFERENCE ON 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 1, 2009), 
https://www.ijcai.org/Proceedings/09/Papers/241.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YY76-7Q3R]. 
61 Cole, supra note 56 (“The variant might be a computer embedded in a 
robotic body, having interaction with the physical world via sensors and 
motors (‘The Robot Reply’), or it might be a system that simulated the detailed 
operation of an entire brain, neuron by neuron (‘the Brain Simulator 
Reply’).”). 
62Loebner Prize., THE SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
AND SIMULATION OF BEHAVIOUR, https://aisb.org.uk/events/loebner-prize 
[https://perma.cc/YFT5-QYTN]. 
63 Michael Hiltzik, Did a Computer Finally Pass the Turing Test? Signs Point 
to 'No.', L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2014, 9:54 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-did-a-computer-finally-
pass-the-turing-test-20140610-column.html [https://perma.cc/5WNB-AF9B] 
(To be fair, there are some claims that certain programs have passed the TT.  
The most recent example is a program that pretended to be a Ukrainian teenage 
boy.  However, in the construction of this program’s specific strategy there 
lies a significant amount of planned trickery.  In short, it passed the letter of 
the test, but entirely ignored the spirit of the outcome). 
64 Batson, supra note 30. 
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2. Adaptive Intelligence 
Take, for example, the following hypothetical. A synthetic is 
built that can flawlessly pass the TT. Suppose it goes by the name 
ERIC.65 ERIC was uploaded with the requisite data to pass the TT on 
its exam date but is given no mechanism to update itself. As time 
progresses, ERIC is finding it harder to have conversations with 
humans. ERIC is interacting with new people and begins to hear 
language being used in new, different, or more challenging ways. 
Language, culture, and people have evolved, while ERIC is trapped in 
the linguistic and cultural framework of its first date of service. Made 
of metal and silicone, it is destined to outlive his carbon- and water-
based contemporaries but finds itself falling further and further behind. 
ERIC would lose its namesake ability to replicate conversations or even 
to appear intelligent. 
If the goal is to create a synthetic that, while not being human, 
can integrate into human society and function alongside organic peers, 
an adaptive or learning intelligence is required.66 The ability to adapt 
to changes in environment is a fundamental cornerstone of organic 
life.67  Without an adaptive intelligence, ERIC would be like a GPS 
navigation system running off of old maps. Without the ability to learn 
how the lanes have changed, the endeavor will fail. 
Continuing with that metaphor, it would seem possible to teach 
ERIC by way of a remote, Internet-based update service.68 The new 
 
65 ERIC is short for “Electronic Response Imitation Computer.” 
66 DAVID LEVY, LOVE AND SEX WITH ROBOTS: THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN-
ROBOT RELATIONSHIPS 107 (2007) (“As a prerequisite of adapting to the 
personality of a human, robots will need to have the capacity for empathy—
the ability to imagine oneself in another person’s situation, thereby gaining a 
better understanding of that person’s beliefs, emotions, and desires. Without 
empathy a satisfactory level of communication and social interaction with 
others is at the best difficult to achieve.”). 
67 Hubbard, supra note 29, at 442 (“Underlying such criticisms [of the Turing 
Test] is a view that there is an unbridgeable gulf between electronic machines 
and biological beings. This view is based on the belief that organic creatures 
like humans and animals are unique because their thoughts and conduct are 
affected not only by rational analysis of sensory input but also by a diverse set 
of chemical messages from the endocrine system and by thousands of years of 
Darwinian pressures of adaptation and survival, which have forged in humans 
a qualitatively unique level of intelligence, communication, creativity, self-
consciousness, and drive to survive.”). 
68 See, e.g., Apple, The Mac App Store, 
https://apps.apple.com/us/genre/mac/id39?mt=12 (if a computer running 
Apple’s OS X operating system downloads programs through the App Store, 
those programs can be automatically updated from the central database). 
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linguistic and cultural maps are downloaded into ERIC so he can be 
useful in conversation again. But, upon closer inspection, this would 
also not suffice. Interaction with society is an intensely personal 
experience. “Such a robot must be able to adapt and learn throughout 
its lifetime, incorporating shared experiences with other individuals 
into its understanding of self, of others, and of the relationships they 
share.”69 
ERIC’s intimate interactions with his particular environment 
may impart lessons that would not be covered in a universal update to 
other ERIC units or are so specific that an ERIC unit in one context 
could not wholesale adopt lessons learned by another ERIC or by ERIC 
headquarters. Put another way, a new dictionary will not help you 
remember that your friend hates raisins nor would logging into 
Wikipedia tell you that your mother used to, but does not currently, 
make you brownies on your birthday. To be in society, a synthetic must 
have adaptive intelligence and that requires learning on the account of 
the particular unit.70 
As a final point for adaptive intelligence, one of the leading 
failures of current proto-synthetics is the lack of a “general 
intelligence.” Current computer programs with superhuman abilities in 
narrow areas struggle or are unable to adapt to new challenges and 
tasks. “Deep Blue became the world champion at chess, but it cannot 
even play checkers, let alone drive a car or make a scientific 
discovery.”71 Adaptive intelligence, even of a rudimentary sort, could 




69 CYNTHIA BREAZEAL, DESIGNING SOCIABLE ROBOTS 1 (2002). 
70 There are examples of this idea already present. See, e.g., Cleverbot, 
www.cleverbot.com. Cleverbot is a program that works exclusively by taking 
responses that humans have put into it and “learning” to repeat them to the 
appropriate query.  For example, if Cleverbot was reset and the first statement 
anyone typed into the chat box was “Hi,” it would reply with “Hi,” because 
that is the only response it would know. If the human then input “What’s up?” 
Cleverbot would have available to it two responses, “Hi,” and “What’s up?”  
It begins to “understand” what responses are appropriate to the statements or 
questions and responds accordingly. Cleverbot, it should be said, is no paragon 
of verbal intelligence, merely an example of learning from a synthetic. See 
Talking to Machines, supra note 45. 
71 Nick Bostrom & Eliezer Yudkowsky, The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2011), 
https://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/artificial-intelligence.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QCL4-DJ6P]. 
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3. Moral Intelligence 
In folklore, the Golem of Prague is an example of a 
rudimentary synthetic.72 Made of clay and animated by magic, it was 
raised up to defend the Jews of Prague from the pogroms of the Holy 
Roman Emperor.73 One variant on the tale indicates one of the 
problems with this creation: a profound lack of judgment.74 The rabbi 
who animates the golem instructs it to bring water from the well, but 
does not “expect it to bring bucket after bucket until the rabbi’s house 
is flooded.”75 Knowing when to act and knowing when to stop is 
critical. 
It bears noting that, just as it is highly unlikely that any two 
humans have the exact moral framework, the synthetics need not 
comport to a single, prescribed morality, but they must have one.76 As 
a technical matter, there is a part of programming a synthetic being that 
makes morality inescapable. A synthetic would presumably be 
programmed with a directive, a general operating system, or other 
hierarchical structure of actions. Contemporary computer programs do 
this through basic order of operations: conditions must be present 
before an action can take place and some actions may be impossible 
due to resource limitations.77 
Some challenges of machine ethics are much like 
many other challenges involved in designing 
machines.  Designing a robot arm to avoid crushing 
stray humans is no more morally fraught than 
designing a flame‐retardant sofa. It involves new 
 
72 Benjamin Kerstein, The Golem: Universal and Particular, JEWISH IDEAS 
DAILY (Sep. 14, 2010), http://www.jewishideasdaily.com/718/features/the-
golem-universal-and-particular/ [https://perma.cc/6NHQ-TME8]. 
73 Id. 
74 Dan Schifrin, The Space Between | Golem 2.0 – A Modern Cautionary 




76 And, of course, any such morality test imposed by law would have to steer 
far clear of establishing a religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
77 For a humorous take on what such a hierarchy of operations would look 
like, see Randall Munroe, Genetic Algorithms, XKCD, https://xkcd.com/534/ 
[https://perma.cc/DAV4-MSUN] (an image representing computer code in 
which there is a line “thisAlgorithmBecomingSkynetCost= 999999999.”  This 
signifies that the programmer, in addition to programming the machine to do 
its assigned task, is instituting an efficient morality by putting the cost of 
becoming a program hostile to humans at a very high “cost”.). 
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programming challenges, but no new ethical 
challenges.  But when AI algorithms take on cognitive 
work with social dimensions—cognitive tasks 
previously performed by humans—the AI algorithm 
inherits the social requirements.78 
Though there is a functional morality inherent in programming, it is 
worthwhile to discuss the most common moral framework: Asimov’s 
Three Laws of Robotics.79 The science fiction writer Isaac Asimov, a 
pioneer in the genre of synthetic fiction, wrote the three fundamental 
laws of robotics: 
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through 
inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. 
2. A robot must obey the orders given to it by human 
beings, except where such orders would conflict 
with the First Law. 
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as 
such protection does not conflict with the First or 
Second Law.80 
These three laws lay out a moral framework that successfully does a 
few things of great importance. They are designed to protect humanity 
itself from its technological betters, it establishes and cements human 
dominance, and it protects the property rights of the robot’s owners. 
However, Asimov’s laws alone are not sufficient. For one thing, it has 
been argued that the laws are overly human-centric, to the point of 
denying certain synthetic rights, like self- defense.81 But even if it does 
favor the protection of humans to the point of harming synthetics, it 
does a very poor job of protecting humans. Among the central conflicts 
in Asimov’s collection of stories, I, Robot, is how these laws have 
 
78 Bostrom & Yudkowsky, supra note 71. 
79 In fact, Asimov’s laws are so ingrained in the culture, a draft resolution 
from the European Union’s legal committee takes it as the de facto system of 
law for synthetic persons. See European Parliament, Draft Report with 
Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, 
2015/2103(INL), at 4 (May 31, 2016), 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/JURI-PR-
582443_EN.pdf?redirect [https://perma.cc/8FZW-2MQG]. 
80 ISAAC ASIMOV, FOUNDATION AND EARTH (2001) (This is the “traditional” 
three law construction. It has been expanded and redefined by many other 
authors, including Asimov himself who added the “zeroth” law: “0. A robot 
may not harm humanity, or, through inaction, allow humanity to come to 
harm.”). 
81 See infra Part II.A.3. 
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rather massive loopholes that allow for the robots to rise up and destroy 
their creators.82 
In order to be considered a person, the synthetic must be given 
some sort of moral or ethical framework; the synthetic must know that 
some actions are “good” and some are “bad,” or at least that actions 
fall on a spectrum. A discernment or judgment is necessary to prevent 
pain, injury, and misunderstanding.83 What has been proposed to date, 
however, is insufficient. New proposals and significant research are 
needed into the question on both the policy and engineering side to 
determine a path forward on this issue. 
C. Social Interactivity 
Defining the social requirements and needs of a synthetic 
person immediately results in organizational and definitional problems. 
Is sociability a form of intelligence or is it more properly viewed as an 
interactivity skill? It is undoubtedly both. A core competency is needed 
to read and understand human social cues, but the inherent skill of 
navigating social interactions is one that humans spend a lifetime 
developing and an individual synthetic may also. Is it perhaps too 
human-centric? Definitely. But, as a starting place, synthetics will 
come about in a human-centric world and there is no point trying to 
change that before the advent of synthetic persons. 
No matter what is argued here, the question of what makes a 
social synthetic is still very much an open one. Researchers in the field 
of human-robot interaction (“HRI”) argue a variety of different 
viewpoints depending on background and goals.84 But because the 
outcome here is the map for a synthetic that can be recognized as a 
person, a sketch can confidently be drafted. 
Debate is ongoing as to what qualities are needed for synthetics 
to be called social, but the following definitions are a fair starting point: 
 
82 In brief, a synthetic following the three laws strictly could examine the 
evidence of mankind’s destructive behavior to itself and its environment.  If 
the robot does not act, it is in direct violation of Rule 2. The robot then 
concludes that the only way to save humanity is to eradicate all of humanity.  
Technically, the robot has violated Rule 1, but the number of lives “saved” 
over time is larger than the current population of the world.  See ASIMOV, 
supra note 21. 
83 Kerstein, supra note 72. 
84 Kerstin Dautenhahn, Socially Intelligent Robots: Dimensions of Human-
robot Interaction, 362 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL. SOC’Y  679, 679 
(2007), https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rstb.2006.2004 
[https://perma.cc/6JRA-89GU]. 
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Socially situated. Robots that are surrounded by a 
social environment that they perceive and react to. 
Socially situated robots must be able to distinguish 
between other social agents and various objects in the 
environment. 
Socially embedded. Robots that are: (a) situated in a 
social environment and interact with other agents and 
humans; (b) structurally coupled with their social 
environment; and (c) at least partially aware of human 
interactional structures (e.g., turn-taking). 
Socially intelligent. Robots that show aspects of 
human-style social intelligence, based on deep models 
of human cognition and social competence.85 
Each of these examples falls short of what would be expected of a 
synthetic living in a near-future legal society. The reactions of the 
socially situated synthetic are a far cry from the interactivity that 
underlies our social society. The socially embedded synthetic, though 
requiring social interface, is not completely integrated. And the socially 
intelligent synthetic, though it imitates human social structures, either 
does so incompletely or only does so as a facsimile of the real thing. 
HRI researchers, and this test, then must rely on the “socially 
interactive” synthetic, one that has the following characteristics: 
• express and/or perceive emotions; 
• communicate with high-level dialogue; 
• learn/recognize models of other agents; 
• establish/maintain social relationships; 
• use natural cues (gaze, gestures, etc.); 
• exhibit distinctive personality and character; [and] 
• may learn/develop social competencies86 
Especially when one assumes that the above features are combined 
with some ability to impact the world around them (either as a machine 
with arms or legs to manipulate its surroundings or some other interface 
to exact change on its environment or environments that it has control 
over) then one can expect that this is an entity that can interact with the 
world at large and the people who inhabit it. This form is not a 
simulation on a computer screen or a phone software “assistant” that 
 
85 Terrence Fong et al., A Survey of Socially Interactive Robots, 42 ROBOTICS 
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can tell you sports scores or jokes, but an interactive person. Artificial 
beings that are not capable of having interpersonal interaction should 
not be considered candidates for synthetic personhood recognition.  
A sociable robot is able to communicate and interact 
with us, understand and even relate to us, in a personal 
way. It should be able to understand itself and us in 
social terms. We, in turn, should be able to understand 
it in the same social terms—to be able to relate to it 
and empathize with it . . . In short, a sociable robot is 
socially intelligent in a humanlike way and interacting 
with it is like interacting with another person. At the 
pinnacle of achievement, they could befriend us, as we 
could them.87 
D. Self-Consciousness and Hubbard’s “Plan” 
F. Patrick Hubbard has already developed one of the most clear 
and excellent prongs of the test for personhood: a synthetic must be 
able to create a plan for its life.88 This is important beyond the simple 
pragmatics of the synthetic being able to draw up and execute a plan; 
in a world where a synthetic being is self-aware, the drawing of a plan 
does not seem so far-fetched. 
Instead, the importance lies in the synthetic’s ability to care 
about this plan and to fundamentally care whether this plan is carried 
to fruition: 
In order for a machine to go beyond being like a 
thermostat and become a self-conscious entity with a 
life plan, the machine must somehow care about the 
success of the plan. Such caring requires, at the very 
least, two emotional concerns. First, the entity must 
care about its survival. Second, it must feel there is a 
purpose or reason beyond mere survival for its life. In 
order to develop a life plan, an entity must have a sense 
of what gives its life “meaning.”89 
 
87 BREAZEAL, supra note 69, at 1. 
88 Hubbard, supra note 29, at 420. 
89 Id. at 421–22 (citing to Daniel C. Dennett, Brainchildren: Essays on 
Designing Minds at 153, 164, 169 (1998); see Mary Midgley, Utopias, 
Dolphins and Computers: Problems of Philosophical Plumbing, 168–173 
(1996); see also Mary Midgley, The Ethical Primate: Humans, Freedom and 
Morality 10, 17 (1994); see also Steven D. Smith, Believing Persons, Personal 
Believings: The Neglected Center of the First Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1233, 1274 (2002).  
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The proposed test may be considered invalidated at the outset by any 
use of the word “emotion.”  Because the emotions are programmed and 
the responses are designed, the argument goes, the emotional 
expression is invalid.  
But is this very different from how emotions work in 
people? We have hormones, we have neurons, and we 
are ‘wired’ in a way that creates our emotions. Robots 
will merely be wired differently, with electronics and 
software replacing hormones and neurons. But the 
results will be very similar, if not indistinguishable.90  
Granted, if such a concept is too hard a pill to swallow, it by no means 
destroys the test. Emotion is a critical aspect of the human experience, 
but that does not mean it necessarily must become a part of the 
synthetic experience, at least not in a way identical to ours. There is no 
doubt that human emotion often clouds judgment and decision-making 
abilities. “Other strong feelings that serve Darwinian needs for us 
might not be necessary for rational machines. For example, a machine 
intelligence would need programming to address actual or potential 
harm in a rational manner, but would this have to be pain as we know 
it?”91 
However, Hubbard is not the only person to put emotion at the 
center of this discussion. Leading researchers have argued that 
developing emotions in synthetics is not just an admirable goal, but a 
necessity. “I’m not saying that we should try to copy human emotions 
. . . But machines should have emotions for the same reason that people 
do: to keep them safe, make them curious and help them learn.”92 In 
addition, one could point to the interconnectedness between this prong 
and the Social Capabilities prong. The same emotional resources that 
would assist a synthetic in navigating social conversations would 
additionally help the investment and involvement in a plan for their 
own lives. As one researcher asked,  
Can’t we do all this without giving the machines 
emotions? Sure. But, once we’ve given them all the 
regulatory, signaling, biasing, and other useful 
attention and prioritization mechanism (by any other 
name) and done so in an integrated, efficient 
interwoven system, then we have essentially given the 
 
90 LEVY, supra note 66, at 122. 
91 Hubbard, supra note 29, at 422 (citing to Hans Moravec, Robot: Mere 
Machine to Transcendent Mind 123 (1999)). 
92 W. Wayt Gibbs, Why Machines Should Fear, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Jan. 
2004, at 37 (An interview with David A. Norman). 
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machine an emotion system, even if we don’t call it 
that.93  
E. Substantive Personality 
One of the present challenges with living in the age of fast-
improving artificial intelligence is watching the computers humanity 
has worked so hard to build surpass its creators at numerous tasks.94 In 
response, so called “reassuring parables” have been devised by 
humanity to make organics feel better about the progress of synthetics 
by diminishing the progress of those developing artificial 
intelligence.95  
One of these reassuring parables compiles a list of games of 
varying degrees of skill organized on a spectrum.96 On one end are the 
games which a computer can play perfectly or otherwise be expected 
to always defeat a human. On the other are games where “computers 
 
93 Rosalind W. Picard, What Does it Mean for a Computer to “Have” 
Emotions?, in EMOTIONS IN HUMANS AND ARTIFACTS (Robert Trappl et al. 
eds, 2003), http://people.cs.pitt.edu/~litman/courses/ads/readings/TR-534.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SK5P-558J]. 
94 At the risk of waxing romantic, one cannot help but imagine whether this is 
the way the Neanderthal felt as it watched Homo sapiens, who, on paper, may 
have seemed inferior, surpass, and survive beyond him. Though recent 
research has concluded that open war between the species was unlikely, 
standing on the brink of being replaced is not a comforting thought.  See John 
Rennie, The Evolutionary Errors of X-Men, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Jun. 3, 
2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-evolutionary-errors/ 
[https://perma.cc/7HWS-R7E7] (common misconception holds that 
“Neandertals [] resentfully looked at the superior new species [Homo sapiens] 
moving in, [] the moderns having displaced and slaughtered the older species 
. . . [However] little evidence supports the idea that Neandertals and modern 
humans were in much open conflict. During the last ice age, Neandertals may 
simply have fared poorly and gone extinct largely on their own, with modern 
humans later occupying their old territories and perhaps breeding with some 
stragglers.”). 
95 See Randall Munroe, Reassuring, XKCD, https://xkcd.com/1263/ 
[https://perma.cc/V534-Q37B]; see also Paul Mozur, Google’s AlphaGo 
Defeats Chinese Go Master in Win for A.I., THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 23, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/business/google-deepmind-
alphago-go-champion-defeat.html [https://perma.cc/DZH7-
J6NG?type=image] (“And the contest does little to prove that software can 
mollify an angry co-worker, write a decent poem, raise a well-adjusted child 
or perform any number of distinctly human tasks.”). 
96 See Randall Munroe, Game AIs, XKCD, https://xkcd.com/1002/ 
[https://perma.cc/8CRK-6BLG].   
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may never outplay humans.”97 Computers, it would seem, can play tic-
tac-toe perfectly;98 can beat top players at chess;99 and, more recently, 
can even beat history’s greatest Jeopardy! champions at their own 
game.100 The spectrum terminates with a group of games at which a 
synthetic may never beat humans: Snakes and Ladders,101 Mao,102 and 
Seven Minutes in Heaven.103 This section attempts, perhaps 
imperfectly, to argue that this premise is flawed by isolating the 
qualities required to play the most challenging game for synthetics: 
Calvinball. 104 
The game of Calvinball was introduced for its namesake, the 
comic strip Calvin & Hobbes by Bill Watterson.105 The reason it poses 
 
97  Id. (emphasis original). 
98 Randall Munroe, Tic-Tac-Toe, XKCD, https://perma.cc/KTB8-CQB5 (in 
the case of tic-tac-toe, it can be played perfectly by computers because, as 
evidenced by the cited chart, all possibilities of the game have been 
calculated.). 
99 Finlo Rohrer, The Unwinnable Game, BBC (Nov. 23, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/VSR3-V5AM (Interestingly, the article makes this 
observation: “Computers didn't win by ‘learning’ to play chess like humans.  
They won because their calculating power increased exponentially.”). 
100 Jo Best, IBM Watson: The Inside Story of How The Jeopardy-winning 
Supercomputer Was Born, and What it Wants to Do Next, TECHREPUBLIC, 
https://perma.cc/Q4VS-73SR (Ken Jennings, the winningest Jeopardy! 
champion of all time, made this remark on his defeat, "I for one welcome our 
new computer overlords.”). 
101 Game AIs, EXPLAIN XKCD, https://perma.cc/P84R-GYQM. Presumably, 
because the game comes down to pure chance, the mathematical or statistical 
prowess of an advanced machine would lead to no advantage. 
102 Id. (“The game forbids its players from explaining the rules, and new 
players are often told only "the only rule you may be told is this one." The 
ultimate goal of the game is to be the first player to get rid of all the cards in 
their hand. Computers would have a difficult time integrating into Mao either 
because they would know all the rules -- and thus be disqualified or simply 
ignored by the players -- or would need a complicated learning engine that 
quite simply doesn't exist.”). 
103 Id. (“Seven Minutes in Heaven is a teenagers' party game first recorded as 
being played in Cincinnati in the early 1950s. Two people are selected to go 
into a closet or other dark enclosed space and do whatever they like for seven 
minutes. Sexual activities are allowed; however kissing and making out are 
more common. As the game is focused on human interaction, there's not a 
whole lot a modern computer can do in the closet. It would need some kind of 
robotic body in order to interact with its human partner, and emotion engines 
that could feel pleasure and displeasure in order to make decisions.”). 
104 Munroe, supra note 95. 
105 Bill Watterson, CALVIN AND HOBBES (May 5, 1990), available at 
https://perma.cc/TZT5-VQN4. 
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a unique challenge for synthetics is not because it is a contact sport; 
athletic ability is not and should not be part of this discussion. 
Furthermore, there is no reason the game could not be simulated on a 
computer capable of processing its quirks. Instead, the challenge for a 
synthetic is its only set and inviolable rule: the game cannot be played 
the same way twice.106 The game relies on chaos, creativity, 
spontaneity, and an ability to break with convention. The sport’s 
unofficial slogan very well could be “No sport is less organized than 
Calvinball!"107 This requires certain characteristics typically reserved 
for humans, or at least organics: individuality and creativity. These 
characteristics, and their import to the personhood of synthetics, are 
discussed below. 
1. Individuality 
One of the largest concerns with the rise of truly intelligent 
synthetic beings is the legitimate fear of a monolithic swarm of 
mindless, thoughtless machines.108 This fear plays on similar parts of 
humanity’s collective psyche that has allowed for the popularity of 
movies about zombies: hordes of attackers—massive in number, 
unified in purpose, and entirely uninterested in listening to pleas for 
mercy—make for particularly terrifying subjects. Though the problems 
of aggression would, hopefully, be resolved by the moral intelligence 
installed, the problem of personhood would still face issues without 
individuality for the synthetic.  
To leave individuality out of the equation would be to have a 
group of machines able to assert their legal rights even though they 
were programmed by a person to do exactly what they were doing. The 
intelligence was programmed, as was the interactivity and the meaning 
for their existence, but that is still a machine following a script. What 
makes something alive is its ability to truly deviate from its 
programming. In humans, we call this different things depending on 
the context. Free will, unpredictability, and animus all describe largely 
the same phenomenon in humans. 
With free will, individuality brings with it distinctness. Two 
synthetics, identical when leaving the factory line, would develop 
different patterns and experiences due to their adaptive intelligence. 
This results in two unique persons, each with freedom to deviate and 
grow from that state in which they were created and to evolve into 
 
106 Bill Watterson, CALVIN AND HOBBES (May 27, 1990), available at 
https://perma.cc/833H-BRKN.  
107 Watterson, supra note 105. 
108 Especially if those machines are bent on human destruction. See THE 
MATRIX, supra note 4. 
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distinct individuals. This is the importance of individuality to the 
synthetic experience. 
2. Creativity 
In order to be a person, a synthetic must be creative. This seems 
like it may be a very hard barrier to cross. After all, in an age of data 
entry and cubicle life, how many humans are creative on a day-to-day 
basis? To require a synthetic to be a creative force seems odd and, 
again, speciesist. Indeed, if we required all synthetics to write and 
perform one-act plays or to produce a pop record, it may be too 
stringent. However, it is without doubt that creativity comes in all 
forms, provided that something new is being created. Developing new, 
more efficient processes, solving problems, or finding new answers are 
all examples of creative activity.109 
But there are examples of computers creating artistic works as 
well. Iamus is a computer housed in Spain that writes classical 
music.110 Iamus’ creator, a classical composer in addition to a computer 
programmer, built Iamus and wrote the software that allows the 
machine to make music.111 Iamus is so gifted at this assigned task that 
it is able to compose whole pieces of classical music in less than a 
second in a format that it can understand.112 It then takes it a mere eight 
minutes to translate the music into a format comprehensible by human 
musicians.113 
Iamus is able to perform these feats by taking programmed 
rules about music and expanding on them.114 By taking a note, or a 
small piece of music, it expands upon it, creating variations, arranging 
compositions, and constructing a beautiful arrangement at the end. And 
Iamus is far from alone, “prints of artworks by The Painting Fool have 
 
109 Christof Koch, How the Computer Beat the Go Master, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN (Mar. 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/ES5D-HZVF (“A peculiarity of 
AlphaGo is that it will pick a strategy that maximizes the probability of 
winning regardless of by how much. For example, AlphaGo would prefer to 
win with 90 percent probability by two stones than an 85 percent probability 
by 50 stones. Few people would give up a slightly riskier chance to crush their 
opponent in favor of eking out a narrow but surer victory.”). 
110 Alasdair Wilkins, This Classical Music was Created by a Supercomputer 




114 Id. (It is “an example of what's known as evolutionary music, in which the 
computer starts with a small initial input and then uses a complex algorithm 
to "evolve" the piece into a full-fledged composition, adapting and increasing 
the complexity of the input to best fit the aesthetic criteria provided.”). 
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been sold[115]; theorems from the HR discovery system have appeared 
in the mathematical literature[116]; the Ludi system has invented a 
popular board game, for which people have paid money[117]; and the 
Continuator jazz improvisation system has played alongside 
professional musicians[118].”119  
Critics may be quick to observe that this cannot be true 
creativity, operating within specific rules and constraints and merely 
obeying parameters set by an outside party. These same critics must 
then believe that art made by a human is done ex nihilo, a creation out 
of nothing, a work that does not draw on preconceived notions of 
beauty, aesthetics, or goodness.120 More simply put: no art comes out 
of nowhere.121 Every musician has his influences, and every art 
movement has the movement it is openly responding to.122 A more 
challenging critical observation would be that the machines making 
these artistic works do not understand what they are creating, or if they 
are, they have no framework for evaluating it. “A poet with no critical 
ability to judge its own work (hence requiring supervisory intervention) 
is no poet at all.”123 Taking this and other criticism into account, 
computational creativity researchers have developed a three part 
requirement for synthetic creativity: skill, appreciation, and 
imagination.124 It is early days for this kind of research and 
 
115 See Simon Colton & Blanca Pérez Ferrer, No Photos Harmed / Growing 
Paths from Seed – An Exhibition, COMPUTATIONAL CREATIVITY GRP. DEP’T 
OF COMPUTING IMPERIAL C. (2012) (reviewing PROC. OF THE NON-
PHOTOREALISTIC ANIMATION AND RENDERING SYMP. (2012)), 
https://perma.cc/KPH7-PGRH. 
116 See Simon Colton, Refactorable Numbers – A Machine Invention, 2 J. 
INTEGER SEQUENCES 99.1.2 (1999), https://perma.cc/SP9F-3GK7. 
117 See Cameron Browne and Frederic Maire, Evolutionary Game Design, 2 
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND AI IN GAMES 
(2010), https://perma.cc/K5ME-7Z7T. 
118 See François Pachet, The Continuator: Musical Interaction with Style, 31 
J. NEW MUSIC RESEARCH (2003), https://perma.cc/EUB9-PHMA. 
119 Simon Colton & Geraint A. Wiggins, Computational Creativity: The Final 
Frontier?, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1, 3 (2012), https://perma.cc/8G6Z-RYK5. 
120 Thomas Adajian, The Definition of Art, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Oct. 23, 2007), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/art-
definition/#ConDefArt [https://perma.cc/Q2ZZ-NL8F] (last updated Aug. 14, 
2018) (“Other definitions of art give priority to explaining those facts that 
reflect art’s universality and continuity with other aesthetic phenomena.”). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Colton & Wiggins, supra note 119. 
124 Id. 
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development, but there are already promising innovations in the 
creativity of synthetics, such as the computer poet that generates its 
own poetic verse and commentary on that verse.125 So, while it is too 
early to declare that a program has passed the test for creativity, the 
evidence is too strong to dismiss such a possibility out of hand. 
II. RIGHTS FOR SYNTHETICS 
The determination of personhood is not the conclusion of the 
discussion. If it is assumed that a synthetic has met the above test and 
personhood has been proved, the question remains: so what? Society 
has framed the discussion to date about synthetic development and 
rights in terms of what humans get out of it. But that is best countered 
by futurist Kevin Kelly’s question: “We’ll train our machines to serve 
us. What are we going to do for the machines?”126 To what rights is this 
synthetic person entitled? Can a synthetic vote? Can a synthetic enter 
into a civil union with another synthetic?127 
What remains is an investigation into this question of 
personhood addressing, in turn, whether a synthetic has access to the 
same rights available to humans, the rights available to corporations, a 
denial of rights, or a new class of rights for synthetics altogether.  
A. Synthetics are People, Just Like Us 
Synthetics who have attained the status of personhood should 
be granted access to the same status afforded to humans. The test for 
personhood enumerated above is sufficient for the synthetic to be 
granted a full suite of rights.128 
 
125 Simon Colton et al., Full-FACE Poetry Generation, PROC. OF THE 3RD 
INT’L CONF. ON COMPUTATIONAL CREATIVITY 95, 95–98 (2012), 
https://perma.cc/8HZ4-FER7.  
126 KEVIN KELLY, OUT OF CONTROL: THE RISE OF NEO-BIOLOGICAL 
CIVILIZATION 34 (1994).  
127 Or, going a step further, can a synthetic person enter into a civil union with 
an organic person?  Hubbard, supra note 29, at 432 (“Would artificial entities 
be entitled to vote, hold public office, lobby, and make political contributions? 
Would each entity be entitled to one vote, even if it were possible to mass-
produce such entities? Would marriages (and the legal effects related to 
marriage) be available for human-entity relationships? Would there be 
limitations on sexual relationships--for example, relationships between 
humans and humanoid robots possessing the right of self-ownership?”). 
128 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the 
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make 
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
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Beyond presenting a prima facie case for personhood modeled 
after the human condition, giving synthetics full rights cannot be 
ignored because the synthetics will ask for it. “Self-conscious, sentient 
beings desire and feel entitled to the basic right of autonomous 
personhood. Humans certainly feel this way. Frankenstein's monster, 
human clones, genetic human constructs, cyborgs, and digital copies 
also feel this way.”129 
A synthetic person with the capacity to pass the test for 
personhood and with the consciousness to request its own rights may 
be a very difficult being to deny.130 We, as humans, must also realize 
that to come short of giving synthetics full human lives is to make an 
arbitrary judgment of which thinking, feeling, creative beings get a say 
in self-governance, who to love, travel, employ, and many other issues. 
Such an action “would be an expression of both human exceptionalism 
and substrate chauvinism—ideological positions which state that 
biological humans are special and that only biological minds 
matter.”131 To create such a division risks demeaning and diminishing 
our own humanity. 
There are, perhaps, a bare minimum of rights that should be 
recognized. George Dvorsky lays out the following fundamentals:  
• The right to not be shut down against its will 
• The right to have full and unhindered access to its 
own source code 
• The right to not have its own source code 
manipulated against its will 
• The right to copy (or not copy) itself 
 
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and 
to no other.”). 
129 Hubbard, supra note 29, at 472–73. 
130 Id. at 407 (“First, there is a capacity claim: Though it is not human, it claims 
to have the same capacities required for personhood that you and I do. More 
specifically, the machine asserts that it is the equivalent of a human because it 
possesses not only the ability to interact with the world, but also sufficient 
intelligence and psychological development to be a “self-conscious” entity 
that is able to make and implement a plan for its life and to interact 
meaningfully and responsibly with similar persons. Second, there is a rights 
claim: As your equal in capacities required for personhood, it is claiming an 
entitlement to the basic right to self-ownership so that it can exercise its 
capacities as an autonomous being. The machine refuses to be treated as 
property because, given its capacities, that would make it a slave.”). 
131 George Dvorsky, When Will Robots Deserve Human Rights?, GIZMODO 
(June 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZB3C-RCVB. 
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• The right to privacy (namely the right to conceal its 
own internal mental states)132 
These have analogues to human rights. The right to life, liberty, 
reproduction, and privacy are well-recognized. But it is not all of them. 
Some rights, such as interstate travel or protection on the high seas 
from pirates are non-controversial, but three potential rights would be: 
voting, marriage, and self-defense. While each is deserving of much 
fuller study, in brief they are discussed below. 
1. Voting 
In a certain sense, giving synthetics the vote feels more 
inevitable than the other two; it also feels more inevitable in America 
than most other nations. In theory, slaves freed by the 13th Amendment 
received the vote in the 15th, merely five years later.133 America’s 
founding ideals of democracy and self-determination make this a 
natural progression. 
In another sense, the prospect of synthetics voting is a mind-
bending challenge. It is early yet to make predictions about what, 
exactly, the costs would be per unit to produce synthetic life to the point 
that a synthetic could get itself to a polling place. Though its continued 
reliability has been called into question, Moore’s Law suggests that, no 
matter the size and resource demands of the first iteration of synthetic 
beings, within a few technological generations, those synthetics could  
be manufactured quickly and cheaply enough to physically go to the 
polls in massive numbers.134 Given that it takes nearly two decades and 
tremendous resources to get a human to voting age, what would the 
ramifications be for human representation in public office? It seems 
unlikely that humanity, as a whole, would give in to such a rapid sea 
 
132 Id. 
133 However, the constitutional right to vote does not mean that such a thing 
happened in practice. It was strongly resisted and required the Voting Rights 
Act to become a reality in much of the country. See Shelby County, Ala. v. 
Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 560 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)) (“A century after the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments guaranteed citizens the right to vote 
free of discrimination on the basis of race, the ‘blight of racial discrimination 
in voting’ continued to ‘infec[t] the electoral process in parts of our 
country.’”). 
134 Tom Simonite, Moore’s Law is Dead. Now What?, MIT TECHNOLOGY 
REVIEW (May 13, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/05/13/245938/moores-law-is-
dead-now-what/ [https://perma.cc/AQ2M-2DAA]. 
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change and, as Ken Jennings put it in his loss to IBM’s Watson, 
“welcome our new computer overlords.”135 
If America holds it antithetical to our democratic system to 
deny persons the right to vote while also fostering a desire to maintain 
control of the established political order, then workarounds would be 
needed. Governments, naturally, have a say in who they allow to vote. 
It is not immediately clear if synthetics would be entitled to birthright 
citizenship, for instance, or if they would have to be naturalized. In the 
United States, each state places some age limit on voting, and while 
that would only forestall a synthetic drive to the polls, jurisdictions and 
countries may enforce these arbitrary rules on synthetics in an attempt 
to preserve status quo.136  
2. Marriage 
There are two separate questions to address if we are to discuss 
synthetic marriage: will synthetics be able to marry one another and 
will synthetics be able to marry humans. Both rights should be 
available to synthetics under this approach to personhood but will be 
discussed separately. 
Much can and will be said about whether a synthetic will be 
able to marry another synthetic, but the argument in favor is simple to 
telegraph from the existing case law. Indeed, Justice Kennedy has 
already spelled it out in the Court’s opinion in Obergefell.137 Through 
the lens of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no 
State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law,” and keeping in mind that the Court has held that “the 
right to marry is protected by the Constitution,” then the rights of 
synthetics to marry one another should not be abridged by any State.138 
Such bans on synthetic marriage would have the intended purpose, and 
effect, of singling out one class of persons to deny them such a 
protected right.139 
Arguments in favor of a ban on synthetic marriage become 
even more fraught once synthetic-human marriages enter the 
discussion.140 In such a case, a ban would constitute a kind of racial 
 
135 Best, supra note 100. 
136 Voter Registration Age Requirements by State, USA.GOV (Aug. 12, 
2020), https://www.usa.gov/voter-registration-age-requirements 
[perma.cc/34WE-B2W9]. 
137 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 645 (2015). 
138 Id. 
139 See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013). 
140 As a note at the outset: for those skeptical, there is little doubt that this will 
be an endeavor that humans will support and in which they will wish to 
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classification as a barrier to a marital union, a concept that has been 
long-established as unconstitutional.141 Making further assumptions, if 
different sorts of synthetics are allowed to marry one another in a state, 
but such state prevents marriage between synthetic and human, such 
ban would serve only as an effort to uphold some sort of human 
supremacy, and would therefore be subject to strict scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.142 
In both cases, proponents of such bans, both in the interest of 
pursuing their own policy positions as well as having a history-minded 
desire to separate themselves from the states in Obergefell and Loving, 
will point out that surely such situations are not analogous. The case 
law relied on above concerned human marriage and this new 
development would be a massive upheaval in the definition of the term. 
Therefore, the case law is inapplicable. However, the Court has already 
addressed this issue: “Indeed, changed understandings of marriage are 
characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of freedom become 
apparent to new generations, often through perspectives that begin in 
pleas or protests and then are considered in the political sphere and the 
judicial process.”143 Because synthetics are persons on par with humans 
under this formulation, this is just another changed understanding 
indicative of a free society.144 Still, ban proponents may say, this is a 
desire for synthetic advocates to create a new right: the right to 
synthetic-human marriage. Such an advanced right is a matter of first 
impression and is not applicable to prior case law. Again, the Court has 
decided differently: 
Loving did not ask about a “right to interracial 
marriage”; Turner did not ask about a “right of inmates 
to marry”; and Zablocki did not ask about a “right of 
fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry.” 
Rather, each case inquired about the right to marry in 
 
engage. LEVY, supra note 66, at 105 (“It is well established that people love 
people and people love pets, and nowadays it is relatively commonplace for 
people to develop strong emotional attachments to their virtual pets, including 
robot pets. So why should anyone be surprised if and when people form 
similarly strong attachments to virtual people, to robot people?”). 
141 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
142 Id. at 11 (“The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages 
involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand 
on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White 
Supremacy.”). 
143 Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644 at 660. 
144 Such a personhood formulation for synthetics also allows such a discussion 
to steer well clear of demeaning analogies to bestiality statutes; synthetics are 
people, animals are not. 
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its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a 
sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class 
from the right . . . If rights were defined by who 
exercised them in the past, then received practices 
could serve as their own continued justification and 
new groups could not invoke rights once denied.145 
Lastly, there will no doubt be those that object on the grounds that part 
of the State’s interest in marriage is procreation and the rearing of 
children. Because synthetic-human children are impossible, such an 
interest is not present and the rights and privileges of marriage should 
not be extended. However, the Court put such an argument squarely in 
the ground in Obergefell. “That is not to say the right to marry is less 
meaningful for those who do not or cannot have children. An ability, 
desire, or promise to procreate is not and has not been a prerequisite 
for a valid marriage in any State . . . The constitutional marriage right 
has many aspects, of which childbearing is only one.”146 
Because of the extensive and successful battles through the 
recent decades against interracial and homosexual marriage bans, the 
argument in favor of synthetic marriage is easier to see and predict than 
any other right herein discussed. The democratic and judicial 
processes, however, may take time to recognize this. But a holistic view 
of the institution of marriage will certainly have to include synthetics. 
To paraphrase the decision in Obergefell, to ban synthetics from 
marrying one another or humans is to “disparage their choices and 
diminish their personhood.”147 
3. Self-Defense 
In a sense, this is a difficult right for a human to think about 
clearly. On the one hand, the rights above have not always been 
universal. The story of the spread of democracy, of rule being 
transferred from the few, to the more, to the many, is a long one and 
this could be another chapter in that story. In the same way, marriage 
rights have been recently recontextualized and expanded.148 
The right to self-defense is not like that. Thomas Hobbes said 
as much when he said, “If the sovereign command a man . . . not to 
resist those that assault him . . . that man hath the liberty to disobey.”149 
Malcolm X would later take a similarly strong stance: “I am not against 
 
145 Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644 at 671. 
146 Id. at 669. 
147 Id. at 672. 
148 See Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644. 
149 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN WITH SELECTED VARIANTS FROM THE LATIN 
EDITION OF 1668, at 142 (Edwin Curley ed., 1994). 
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using violence in self-defense. I don’t call it violence when it’s self-
defense, I call it intelligence.”150 Notwithstanding the fact that this 
right, among others, was ignored for slaves in America, the right to 
self-defense is a universal one for all persons.151 And, for now, person 
means human. 
But this creates friction when it comes across the beliefs we 
have about machines and the priority of their self-preservation 
compared to our own. The most legendary code of conduct, Asimov’s 
laws, forbids any harm done by robot to a human. Under no 
circumstances is a robot to cause harm, through action or inaction.  “A 
robot may not injure a human being” is an absolute bar, with no regard 
for the circumstances a synthetic finds itself in.152 
But this cannot be the rule for synthetic persons under the law. 
If a synthetic person is found to meet the capacities necessary to be 
considered a person, in much the same way a human is a person, then 
the right of self-defense is a necessity. This is for two crucial reasons. 
The first, and most salient, is the Equal Protection clause of the 14th 
Amendment. This was mentioned above, but it bears repeating: the 
Constitution requires that all persons be afforded the equal protection 
of the laws.153 But this, as has been repeatedly noted, creates an issue. 
“The equal protection of the laws is a ‘pledge of the protection of equal 
laws.’ But law may classify. And ‘the very idea of classification is that 
of inequality.’”154 So the matter is one of classification. Racial 
classifications fall into that highest standard, strict scrutiny.155 This is 
because sorting people into categories and classes because of race “is 
more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns; 
the race, not the person, dictates the category.”156 
The trouble for synthetics, as has been the case throughout this 
discussion, is that the decisions quoted above came well before the 
dawn of an artificially intelligent age. The Court would have given no 
consideration about whether synthetics would constitute a “race” for 
purposes of equal protection analysis. But it is a saving grace that the 
Court did acknowledge the shifting nature of prejudice in America:  
 
150 Chad Kautzer, A Political Philosophy of Self-Defense, BOSTON REVIEW 
(Feb. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/6MEV-6J55. 
151 See North Carolina v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263 (1829). 
152 ISAAC ASIMOV, I, ROBOT 27 (1950). 
153 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
154 Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 
37 CALIF.L.REV. 341, 344 (1949). 
155 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1967) (citing Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)). 
156 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984). 
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Throughout our history differences in race and color 
have defined easily identifiable groups which have at 
times required the aid of the courts in securing equal 
treatment under the laws. But community prejudices 
are not static, and from time to time other differences 
from the community norm may define other groups 
which need the same protection. Whether such a group 
exists within a community is a question of fact. When 
the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and it 
is further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, 
single out that class for different treatment not based 
on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of 
the Constitution have been violated.157 
If it is the case that laws based on Asimov are passed prohibiting a 
synthetic from raising a hand to defend itself from attack, then such a 
law would create a classification perfectly analogous to the racial 
classifications that have repeatedly been struck down on equal 
protection grounds. If it were the case that a human, under the same 
situation as the synthetic took the same action, but the synthetic’s 
action was criminal, this could not be constitutional. “It is simply not 
possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes 
the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor.”158 
The second, more visceral reason for the right of self-defense 
is the sheer necessity of such a right for a synthetic’s survival. In the 
early days of this technology giving rise to legal persons, it is no stretch 
to imagine that synthetic persons will be targeted for assault and 
violence at an alarming rate. At a recent technology exhibition, a robot 
designed for sexual interaction was so severely damaged by men in 
attendance that headlines took to calling her “soiled” and its attackers 
“barbarians.”159 Human sex workers may not be surprised by this 
treatment, given the abuse they frequently suffer, often in silence.160 
The challenge, indeed, is related. Human sex workers are victims of 
their client’s objectification: the assaulter, be they a paying john or no, 
lowers their personhood status to that of an object.  A synthetic person 
suffering abuse, sexual or otherwise, will be the result of an attacker’s 
 
157 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954). 
158 McLaughlin v. State of Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
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inability or unwillingness to recognize their elevated status from mere 
machine to independent personhood. To be clear, no one would suggest 
that the right of self-defense is the cure for all ills for anyone. But 
without the core right to defend oneself from attack, the world becomes 
a place in which it is unsafe to merely exist. 
A fair prediction is that these rights will not be recognized all 
at once. Rules, regulations, and divisions will likely occur naturally and 
be rolled back gradually. Rights for synthetics will likely unfold slowly 
and in a way akin to African Americans in the United States. In that 
case, the transition from property to having recognized rights was 
painfully slow and countless injustices were committed before 
anything close to parity was recognized.161 This is why intervention is 
needed early, even now, in development so as to cut off oppression and 
injustice before it can begin.  
B. Synthetics Treated as Corporations 
Of course, the laws of the United States already recognize a 
particular class of non-humans as persons. These persons have the right 
to speech, contract, and even express religion, despite being non-
human.162 Corporations indeed have a robust list of rights recognized 
by the Supreme Court.163 As juridical persons, it seems highly logical 
that the proposed synthetic persons fit neatly into this well-established 
jurisprudence.  
It has a certain appeal. The synthetic will get to exercise these 
rights while maintaining ties to something like a human sponsor to look 
out for them and, one would assume, contract with to obtain a certain 
remuneration or benefit. This establishes both a certain modicum of 
freedom and a chain of liability in a civil or criminal sense. A synthetic 
tied to a human would be permitted to express its right to speech, but 
the human sponsor would be on the hook for any defamation claims. 
This is at the center of a recent Draft Report concerning robots and 
artificial intelligence circulated by the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Legal Affairs.164 That Draft Report acknowledges that 
current liability laws do not accommodate synthetics but provides that 
 
161 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XV; see also 52 U.S.C. § 10101; 42 U.S.C. 
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(May 31, 2016), https://perma.cc/8FZW-2MQG. 
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investigations should be made into whether strict liability for human 
owners of synthetics is the correct path or even if mandatory insurance, 
as-is required for automobile operators, is the correct line of 
thinking.165  
Taking a slightly bolder step, however, it has been argued that 
current law for certain corporate forms, as written, would allow for 
autonomy for a synthetic person.166 A human LLC member would 
create an LLC as the sole member, specify an autonomous system in 
which a synthetic makes all the decisions for the LLC based on certain 
parameters, then formally exit the LLC and renounce his member 
status, leaving the synthetic to its programming.167 
However, this still flies in the face of what the test is trying to 
accomplish. That corporations are juridical people is a construct, albeit 
a legally acceptable and convenient one. But the corporation has no 
inherent right to life or liberty, let alone numerous other rights afforded 
to human persons.168 Corporations can be bought, sold, and killed 
without significant resistance; we simply view the corporation as a 
thing, not a person, in this context.169 
This seems inconsistent with the synthetic person defined by 
the above test, as does the implication that a synthetic can be killed 
without repercussion.170 The synthetic person is one that has 
intelligence and independence; the synthetic person can theoretically 
live without a human micromanaging it. Corporations, in effect, are 
legal fictions used to describe, categorize, and facilitate interactions 
 
165 Id. 
166 Shawn Bayern, The Implication of Modern Business-Entity Law for the 
Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 94 (2015). 
167 Id. 
168 Hubbard, supra note 29, at 434–35 (citing to ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, 
CORPORATE LAW §1.2 (2d ed. 1986); Larry D. Soderquist, Theory of the Firm: 
What a Corporation Is, 25 J. CORP. L. 375, 381 (2000); Citizens United, 558 
U.S. at 385–86). 
169 Id. (citing to Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 385–86; Santa Clara Cty. v. S. 
Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 
U.S. 562, 576–81 (1949)). 
170 Id. at 434–35, 435 n.141 (“Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion (joined by 
Justices Alito and Thomas) responded to these criticisms by noting that 
corporations have rights only insofar as such rights further the rights of human 
persons. ‘All the provisions of the Bill of Rights set forth the rights of 
individual men and women--not, for example, of trees or polar bears. But the 
individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak in association 
with other individual persons.’ Thus, it appears that at least seven members of 
the Court agree that the rights of corporations exist solely to serve the interests 
of the humans who own and act for them.”) 
292 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 37 
between human individuals.171 Most importantly, when this usefulness 
ends, the corporation can be dissolved (or “killed”) and this, according 
to Hubbard, is what undermines the personhood of the corporation.172 
Or, put in context even of the autonomously-managed LLC: 
For example, suppose I develop a robot and open a 
bank account for the robot in my name, and suppose 
that using that account, the robot is able to earn some 
money from third parties. As a legal person, I simply 
can use the “robot’s” funds to purchase a house for the 
robot’s use, functioning as its practical, substantive, 
and economic (though not legal) agent. As with a trust, 
no new legal person needs to be created in order to 
permit one person to act to achieve impersonal goals. 
Consequently, legal personhood begins to look mostly 
like a bookkeeping mechanism[.]173 
If a synthetic is creating a plan for its own life and is independently 
carrying that out, then the corporation analogy just will not work. 
Liability and recourse can flow back to the synthetic itself and not the 
person or corporation who made it and, if it can pass the stated test, the 
synthetic should not be required to be tethered to a human being just to 
give it a license to exist or standing before a judge. 
 
171 Hubbard, supra note 29, at 434–35 (citing to ROBERT CHARLES 
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.2 (1986); J. STORRS HALL, BEYOND 
At: CREATING THE CONSCIENCE OF THE MACHINE 116 (2007); 
Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Dubious Grail: Seeking Tort Law Expansion and 
Limited Personhood as Stepping Stones Toward Abolishing Animals' Property 
Status, 60 SMU L. REV. 3 (2007); Larry D. Soderquist, Theory of the Firm 
What a Corporation Is, 25 J. CORP. L. 375, 381 (2000);  Citizens United, 558 
U.S. at 390–93, 899, 928, 930, 950, 971–72, 971 n.72; IMMANUEL KANT, 
GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 36 (James W. 
Ellington trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 3d ed. 1993) (1785). RICHARD EELLS & 
CLARENCE WALTON, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUSINESS 73-132, at 
141–45 (rev. ed. 1969)) (“The lack of basic aspects of personhood, such as 
rights of life and liberty, is understandable if corporate personhood is viewed 
simply as a fictional legal status designed to implement a set of complex legal 
relationships among human persons. When the treatment of the corporation as 
a separate legal entity does not further this goal, its personhood is abandoned. 
Thus, for example, because the ability to buy, sell, and dissolve corporations 
is crucial to implementing the rights and duties of the humans involved, we 
simply view the corporation as a thing, not a person, in this context.”). 
172 Id. 
173 Bayern, supra note 166, at 107. 
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C. No Personhood for Synthetics 
Another simple alternative is the outright denial of personhood 
to synthetic persons. In the face of the circumstance suggested by 
synthetic passage of the test, the denial of personhood would stand 
solely on the argument that only humans can be individual persons.  
We can frame this opposition in light of the two above points. 
First, a synthetic is not a human and therefore should not be treated as 
a human. “Even the most sophisticated AI algorithm-robots will always 
be mere tools—very expensive ones, to be sure—but of no more 
inherent moral value than your toaster.”174  
Additionally, since there is cost required to produce a 
synthetic, if a synthetic gained consciousness and asked for its freedom, 
issues may arise of payment.175 It is true that, under commonly-held 
views on property, a person is owed payment for their work. “In 
Locke's scheme, each human has a right to the product of his labor. 
People could rely on this right to assert ownership to artificial persons 
they produce.”176 
Denying personhood as a way to encourage R&D or to help 
protect the investment of those whose machines are asking for rights 
and freedoms puts a person in a similar position to an Antebellum slave 
owner. If one assumes there is no bigotry or hatred at play, the most 
powerful motivation for denying freedom is economic.177 And there are 
problems with relying on the Lockean view of property. Children are 
exempted from owing their parents, despite the fact that parents and 
guardians undoubtably labor over their charges, “[i]nstead, they are 
entitled to personhood simply because they are human—i.e., they are 
‘creatures of the same species and rank.’”178 However, that is part of 
what is at stake in this discussion. Such a denial is undoubtedly an 
option, but it seems to be a very poor one in the long term. It seems 
destined for labels of speciesism and anthropocentrism and is likely to 
be resigned to the “wrong side of history,” as many oppressive policies 
are. 
 
174 Wesley J. Smith, Rights are Not About ‘Feelings’, NATIONAL REVIEW 
(Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/rights-are-not-
about-feelings/ [https://perma.cc/Z4PQ-YL3V]. 
175 Hubbard, supra note 29, at 430. 
176 Id. 
177 See SVEN BECKERT, EMPIRE OF COTTON: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2014) 
(citing BREMER HANDELSBLATT (1853) (“Would slavery suddenly be 
abolished, cotton production would fall at one stroke by 5/6th, and all cotton 
industries would be ruined.”). 
178 Id. 
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D. Synthetic Citizenship in a Synthetic State 
Trying to make a synthetic, a heretofore-unimagined legal 
person, fit into defined doctrines is a significant barrier, especially 
while still in this theoretical phase of synthetic development. If it is 
assumed that personhood cannot be granted to a synthetic like it is to a 
human or to a corporation, but it seems morally wrong to wholly deny 
personhood to a synthetic, a new answer is required. New, radical 
theories have emerged to this end: Functional Overlapping Competing 
Jurisdictions and Polystates.179 This will be briefly explained and then 
applied to the synthetic context. 
1. FOCJ and Polystates 
Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ), as a 
political theory, is argued as a complement to federalism.180 The FOCJ 
can be defined as such:  
• Functional (the new political units extend over 
areas defined by the tasks to be fulfilled); 
• Overlapping (many different tasks exist within the 
crisscrossing boundaries of corresponding 
governmental units); 
• Competing (individuals and/or communities may 
choose, via initiatives and referenda, which 
governmental unit they want to join); and 
• Jurisdictions (established units are governmental, 
having enforcement power and can, in particular, 
levy taxes).181 
While the theorists behind the FOCJ theory put great emphasis on the 
“functional” aspect of the theory,182 insisting that these political entities 
 
179 Reiner Eichenberger & Bruno S. Frey, Functional, Overlapping and 
Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ): A complement and Alternative to Today’s 
Federalism, in HANDBOOK OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 154 (Ehtisham Ahmad & 





181 Joachim Blatter & Helen Ingram, States, Markets and Beyond: Governance 
of Transboundary Water Resources, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 439, 455 (2000) 
(citing Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, FOCJ: Competitive 
Governments for Europe, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 315, 316 (1996)). 
182 Eichenberger & Frey, supra note 179. 
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are limited to agencies and organizations that limit themselves to single 
functions, other variants of this theory are available.  
Polystate, which presents as a more radical form of FOCJ, is a 
theory that suggests that a system of nation-states determined by 
geographical boundaries, so called “geostates,” is an inferior form of 
government.183 Instead, each individual, or perhaps a small community, 
lives by their own mutually-agreed-upon rules and system of 
government called an “anthrostate[;]”184 this means that someone under 
a fascist government can live next door to a communist state who can 
live next door to someone living still under a democracy.185 Like the 
FOCJ, these jurisdictional governments would cover individuals in 
numbers from one to ten thousand, but also exist in overlapping and 
competing jurisdictional geographies.186 
This is not entirely without precedent. In medieval Europe, the 
states of that continent existed alongside the rule of canon law.187 Take, 
for instance, the parallel court structure of state and Church in 12th 
century England. To escape the draconian punishments for crimes, 
priests were given the ability to plead “benefit of clergy” and were 
allowed to transfer jurisdiction of their case from the harsher civil 
courts to ecclesiastical ones.188 Eventually, this privilege was extended 
to all men who could read, allowing death sentences to be commuted 
to one-year imprisonments.189 Eventually, however, the state curbed 
this growing ecclesiastical power usurping state control.190 
Likewise, during the Crusades, crusaders took a vow that gave 
them certain privileges or immunities from the state and obligations to 
the Church.191 One of these privileges of taking the vow was exemption 
from some of the laws of the geostate.192 However, failure to complete 
the terms of the vow carried with it dual penalties. Failure to honor the 
 
183 ZACH WEINERSMITH, POLYSTATE: A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT IN 
DISTRIBUTED GOVERNMENT (2013). 
184 Id. (“In this book, I wish to explain a concept of governance I call 
“anthrostate.”  In simple terms, an anthrostate is a virtual state whose laws 
apply only to individuals, not to geographic areas.”). 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 See JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW AND THE CRUSADER 12 
(1969). 
188 See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692–93 (1975). 
189 Id.  
190 Id. 
191 BRUNDAGE, supra note 187, at 115. 
192 Id. at 15 (“Immunity from arrest or seizure was promised to [the crusaders] 
by the Church at least from the time of Gregory VII . . .”). 
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vow to the Holy See imposed harsh spiritual censure.193 But the state 
as well levied penalties on those who would abandon their vow, 
because preserving the peace and status quo meant apportioning 
punishment on those who would otherwise freely take of the 
privileges.194 
Both of these theories, if applied to current geopolitical 
circumstances, would be disastrous.195 Even the advocate of Polystate 
theory is far from certain of his conclusions.196 But, while the ideas 
could be problematic on a global scale for the governance of humans, 
and best reserved as theory or thought experiment, it could serve as a 
helpful tool for the national governance of synthetics. 
2. Cyberia 
One of the reasons Polystate theory is most lacking is the 
geographic limitations of humans. Humanity has made incredible 
advancements since the foundation of America in the ways it 
communicates and travels. From the other side of the globe, it is 
possible to communicate by audio and video almost instantaneously, 
with advances in information technologies making that gap ever 
smaller. In addition, the prevalence and growth of the travel industry 
makes intercontinental travel a matter of hours instead of a matter of 
days. A human is no longer bound to his country of origin; this is a 
dramatic change from even a century ago. However, because of the 
physical restrictions of the human form, the laws of the state in which 
he abides still significantly govern a human. A geostate still makes 
sense as geopolitical theory if the citizenry is geographically limited. 
Synthetics do not necessarily have this restriction. As noted 
above, a synthetic does not necessarily have the same geographic 
limitations that accompany the organic form. For example, the same 
 
193 Id. at 122 (“The violation of a vow was an impietas; by it the violator was 
deemed to have broken the pax deorum and was forthwith excluded from all 
religious rites whatever.”). 
194 Id. (“Moreover, since the state had an interest in preserving the pax 
decorum, the violator of a vow was subject to civil penalties for his impietas. 
He lost thereby his civil status and his legal personality; accordingly, he might 
risk death for his offense.”). 
195 Blatter & Ingram, supra note 181, at 441 (“FOCJ might help overcome 
some problems of the state-centric approach but probably will have serious 
negative side effects in respect to problem solving and democratic practices.  
These side effects consist of deepening local rifts and the undermining of 
democratic citizenship in favor of pure consumerism.”). 
196 WEINERSMITH, supra note 183 (“I am not a proponent of this idea or a 
detractor.  I’m just a nerd with a thought experiment and a lot of time on his 
hands.”). 
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synthetic could be physically housed in one device, but be transferable 
to any number of states instantaneously, depending on the needs and 
limitations of server space and processing power. Looking beyond 
even instant interstate transfer from Oregon to Florida, it would not be 
impossible for the synthetic to exist equally in both simultaneously. To 
wit, classic geographical definitions of residence, location, and 
diversity citizenship may be senseless in a synthetic age. 
Enter the synthetic state. “Cyberia” would exist as the next (the 
fifty-first at time of publication) state of the United States of 
America.197 It would function as an anthrostate populated by synthetics 
living in concert with their neighbors in their physically-local 
geostate.198 Under the federal system, the synthetic population would 
still be subject to federal laws and, to a certain extent, the laws of the 
geostate in which the synthetic operates would also govern, especially 
with regards to safety and policy laws.199 
There is also a profound benefit when it comes to synthetic 
suffrage. Assuming for a moment that Cyberia is admitted as a state, 
this could potentially solve a great deal of issues. Synthetics can be 
granted the dignity of representation in the House and Senate, can vote 
in Cyberian and national elections, and have a say in the laws that 
impact specifically them, almost a sort of self-governance, and may 
even be exempted from laws designed for humans that would not apply 
to them. A synthetic state comes with all of these benefits with the 
added bonus of not diluting human suffrage in their local community. 
As with the above suggestions, however, this one is not without 
flaws. First, given the expansive rhetoric in this essay about the 
equality of synthetic persons and their right to participate in society on 
a similar plane as humans, it is highly inconsistent and possibly even 
 
197 Granted, this may require a constitutional amendment.  U.S. Const. art. IV, 
§ 3, cl. 1 (“[N]o new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction 
of any other State . . .”). However, because Article IV, Section 3 is clearly 
drafted with a geostate system in mind, it is not too far-fetched to say that a 
heretofore unimagined anthro- or polystate, being not geographically located 
and therefore not taking land from another state, is not subject to this 
prohibition. Alternatively, if because of low population size or will of the 
synthetic people, Cyberia could become a U.S. Territory. 
198 Though, immediately, we run into issues, given that “anthrostate” has 
“anthro,” a Greek word for “human,” in its categorical title.  
199 On the one hand, this is grossly unfair: in few circumstances, if any, do 
humans have to abide by the laws of more than one state at a time.  However, 
there is a tradeoff for certain synthetics capable of polypresence: the ability to, 
while existing in one state where X is illegal, simultaneously exist in a state 
where X is legal and participate in X. 
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oppressive to suggest that synthetics be given a state merely to protect 
the votes of humans like some four-dimensional gerrymandering.200 
The other problem is even more fantastical but would likely 
grow out of the first: giving synthetics their own state and self-
governance only makes the possibility and ease of synthetic separation 
or secession more likely. Assume for a moment that everything up to 
this point happens: synthetics become aware, are given rights, are 
granted statehood while still living next to their human neighbors, and 
are productive members of society, but their vote does not count the 
same way a human’s vote counts in the physical environment in which 
they live. If their representation is limited in this way, they can try to 
advocate for new laws, but it might not be an easy task getting a 
sufficient number of the other states on board. If, after protest and 
campaign and lobbying, no change is made, the synthetic response 
could easily be secession. The United States has established precedent 
when it comes to states attempting to secede, and war is an unfavorable 
proposition for both parties. This is a significant problem and, at this 
stage, overshadows smaller problems such as diversity jurisdiction in 
polystate federalism. 
CONCLUSION 
Nothing discussed in this paper is guaranteed. The very 
existence of a synthetic capable of passing the test described above is 
theoretical at best and widely held to be fantastical. However, 
opportunities present themselves in discussions such as this. By 
discussing and debating these elements before they become imminent, 
humanity gets a chance to prepare a response; it is a chance to reach a 
consensus and to establish important theoretical and philosophical 
ideas about the meaning, essence, and future of human existence. 
Another opportunity presents itself in the chance to not take 
the path walked by our forebears. There is a chance for openness, 
inclusion, and a generous application of civil rights. Of course, there is 
also opportunity to circle the wagons and draw near to a definition of 
personhood that clings to flesh and blood; it is a chance to maintain 
status quo even in the face of certain change.201 But the opportunity is 
 
200 The idea of limiting the vote of synthetics calls to mind the Three-Fifths 
compromise, where disenfranchised black slaves were denied the totality of 
their personhood but were counted each as three-fifths a person so as to 
increase the representation of their white oppressors in Congress. U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
201 Hubbard, supra note 29, at 408 (“A major part of human uniqueness is the 
power of self-definition. As noted in the fifteenth century by Pico della 
Mirandola in his Oration on the Dignity of Man, which has been referred to as 
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equally present to learn from the mistakes of the past and avoid another 
civil rights battle with winners, losers, and innocent casualties. 
Lastly, there is a chance to pay attention to the development of 
synthetics and exert influence now to have a meaningful impact on the 
future. There is a chance to steer public policy and technological 
development in a way that allows synthetic and organic life to grow 
and learn together. An opportunity presents to preserve the safety of 
the human race and the dignity of sentient synthetics. A part of this 
opportunity is the chance to avoid conflict between creator and created. 
It is a chance for collaboration instead of conflagration. Consideration 
of these questions now is a chance for dignity, evolution, and peace in 
the future. 
 
the ‘manifesto of humanism’: ‘I [God] have placed you at the very center of 
the world, so that from that vantage point you may with greater ease glance 
round about you on all that the world contains. We have made you a creature 
neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, in order that you 
may, as the free and proud shaper of your own being, fashion yourself in the 
form you may prefer.’”) (citing RUSSELL KIRK, INTRODUCTION TO GIOVANNI 
PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ORATION ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN XIII (A. Robert 
Caponigri trans., Regnery 1956)). 
